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PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS OF FACT: A NEW
THEORY
CHARLES V. LAUGHLIN*
Statement of the Problem
When a party to a judicial proceeding objects to an offer of evi-
dence, the judge will usually be able to make a ruling on the objection
by considering only the terms of the offer.' In the usual case a judge
will make an authoritative ruling at the time of the objection, either
admitting or excluding the offered evidence. In reaching a determina-
tion on the objection, the judge will not consult the jury and will
make no direct reference to his ruling before the jury, except to in-
struct the jurors to disregard any evidence which has been stricken.
The trial judge's ruling, of course, will be subject to review on appeal.
The principle that the judge rather than the jury should determine
the admissibility of evidence is based upon at least three premises:
(1) the problem of admissibility will always present a question of law,
and it is basic that judges decide legal questions; (2) the expeditious
conduct of the trial demands that the judge have power to make
summary decisions upon questions of admissibility; and (3) collabo-
ration with the jury on the question of admissibility might defeat the
very purpose of the exclusionary rule.
However, in some situations2 the question of admissibility of evi-
dence cannot be determined from the offer itself. In some instances,
it may be necessary for either the judge or the jury to make a factual
determination before the judge can determine whether or not the
evidence offered should be admitted. A few of the many examples of
this problem may serve as illustrations: A confession may not be used
against a criminal defendant unless it was voluntarily obtained; vol-
*Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University. Assistance by my students,
Eric A. Hauser, William A. Simon, and Malcolm H. Squires, Jr. is gratefully acknowl-
edged. Their participation was financed by a Robert E. Lee Research Grant from
Washington and Lee University.
'This is not to suggest that the ruling will always be easy to make, or that the
answer to the question of admissibility is readily found in the authoritative legal source
materials. It may be that the judge will have to fall back upon remote analogies, his
own Conclusions as to policy matters, or his own beliefs as to what should be expected
according to the normal course of human experience. Of course he will consider such
authoritative legal source materials, e.g., decisions and legislative enactments, as are
available.
-l'hese situations are probably a minority, although they nevertheless constitute
a substantial number.
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untariness of the alleged confession is a preliminary question of fact.
A witness may not testify to something he claims to have perceived
unless he had an adequate opportunity to observe the matter to which
he offers to testify; opportunity to observe is a preliminary question
of fact. Testimony regarding the contents of a document may not be
heard unless a foundation is established by showing a legitimate
excuse for not producing the document itself; whether or not such a
foundation has been established is a preliminary question of fact. A
criminal defendant objects to the testimony of an offered witness
upon the ground that the witness is his spouse; 3 if there is a true issue
as to whether the defendant and the witness are in fact married, for
example, whether a purported divorce is legally valid, a resolution of
that question is a fact which must be determined before it can be
decided whether or not to admit the testimony of the witness.
Inherent in all situations in which a judicial determination of
admissibility requires a preceding factual determination is the prob-
lem of deciding whether the judge or the jury should determine the
preliminary questions of fact. In some situations, the judge should
make the decision and admit or reject the evidence depending upon
whether he finds that the fact exists. In other instances, the judge
should admit the disputed evidence upon a prima facie showing and
instruct the jury that, before it decides the main issues of the case,
it must decide a preliminary factual question. The jury is further
instructed that whether or not it considers the disputed item of evi-
dence in deciding the main issues of the case depends upon the con-
clusion reached on the preliminary question of fact.
Current Orthodox Analysis
Until the 1920's, the standard solution to the problem of who
should decide preliminary questions of fact was simply that since the
judge decides problems of admissibility, he should also decide all
preliminary facts upon which admissibility depends.' However, since
the 1920's a new orthodoxy has developed. A rule, divided into two
'A criminal defendant's spouse may not testify against him over his objection.
'Maguire & Epstein, Preliminary Questions of Fact in Determining the Admissi-
bilit' of Evidence, 40 HARV. L. REV. 392 (1926). If the results of decisions be examined,
however, rather than the official pronouncements, no such harmony existed. The case
law was in considerable confusion. J. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE: COMMON SENSE AND COMMON
LAW 217-30 (1947); Morgan, Functions of Judge and Jury in the Determination of
Preliminary Questions of Fact, 43 HARV. L. REV. 165, 170-75 (1929). Various practices
were suggested or found support in decided cases. Most of the suggestions are enumer-
ated by Professors Maguire and Morgan in the aforementioned sources.
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complementary sets of principles, seems to offer a simplified and
easily applicable solution to the problem of preliminary questions of
fact. While credit for the basic formulation of these principles must
go primarily to Professors Morgan, Maguire and Epstein,5 a modern
unified statement of this formulation has been presented by Professor
McCormick.r According to the formulation, if the application of an
exclusionary rule based upon a "technical" rule of evidence depends
upon a preliminary fact, the existence of the fact should be deter-
mined by the judge. The jury may or may not be allowed to pass
subsequently upon the weight of the evidenceJ but it cannot com-
pletely disregard the evidence upon the ground that the evidence
never should have been admitted. The term "competency" of evi-
dence is sometimes used to refer to such situations, examples of
which are the hearsay rule and the various privileges."
Professor McCormick contrasts competency cases with cases in
which "the relevancy, i.e., probative value, of a fact offered in evi-
dence depends on the existence of another conditioning [i.e.,
preliminary] fact."9 In such a situation the proponent of evidence
need merely make a showing sufficient to enable the judge to deter-
mine that a reasonably prudent juror could find the existence of the
preliminary fact.'0 The jury is then instructed to make the prelimi-
nary factual determination. If the jury finds that the preliminary fact
does not exist, it must disregard the offered evidence; if the finding
as to the existence of the preliminary fact is affirmative, the jury
must give the offered evidence the weight to which it thinks the
evidence is entitled.
This competency-relevancy dichotomy seems to be expressed by
the proposed Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and
Magistrates.' Rule 104 deals with preliminary questions and reads in
part as follows:
Su pra note 4.
'C. MCCORMICK. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 53, at 121-125 (2d ed. 1972) (herein-
after cited as MCCORMICK).
'This presents a complicating circumstance dealt with in text accompanying note
58. infra.
'Although listed together in McCormick's book, these two examples present quite
different situations. Cf. text accompanying notes 44, 50, at 51, infra.
'MCCORMICK at 124-25.
'"As a general proposition it may be said that a judge will never submit any issue
to the jury unless he believes that the evidence is such that the issue could be decided
either way. The obvious exception is that in a criminal case the judge may not with-
draw an issue unfavorable to the defendant from the jury.
"The proposed federal rules of evidence were drafted by a committee of judges,
practitioners and law professors appointed by the United States Supreme Court. The
19741
288 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXI
(a) Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary questions
concerning the qualifications of a person to be a witness, the
existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall
be determined by the judge, subject to the provisions of sub-
division (b) ....
(b) Relevancy conditioned on fact. When the relevancy of evi-
dence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the
judge shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of
evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the
condition.
Alternate Theory
Before specifying in detail the ambiguities in the orthodox theory,
a brief preview of the alternate theory advocated by this writer is
offered. In a situation in which the preliminary fact has no signifi-
cance in the case except to condition the admissibility of evidence,"
the alternate theory reaches the same conclusion as the orthodox
theory: the judge decides whether the preliminary fact exists. If his
decision is affirmative, the evidence is admitted; if negative, it is
excluded. If the evidence is admitted, the jury would have no occa-
sion to consider whether or not the preliminary fact exists because it
has no bearing upon any question the jury is called upon to decide.
A different basis for analysis exists in cases in which the prelimi-
nary fact has a bearing upon the case apart from conditioning the
admissibility of evidence.' 3 In such a situation, if the challenged evi-
dence is admitted, the jury must still evaluate the evidence for and
against the conditioning fact because whether the fact exists or not
has a bearing upon the main issues of the case. Supposedly, under
process took several years. In their final form they were approved by the United States
•Judicial Conference and the United States Supreme Court (Mr. Justice Douglas dis-
sent ing). They were ordered to take effect July 1, 1973 unless Congress should provide
otherwise. They were not as favorably received in Congress as had been anticipated.
Congress enacted S.583, which provides that the Rules shall not take effect unless
expressly so ordered by Congress. S.583, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). On February 6,
1974. the House of Representatives passed HR 5463 which is intended as a substitute
tor the rules. HR 5463, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). In some instances the rules are
included in the bill as they were approved by the Supreme Court. In other instances,
changes have been made, and some of the proposed rules have been deleted altogether.
When the proposed rules are referred to in this article, it may be assumed that they
are included in the Congressional bill in the same form unless it is otherwise indicated.
"'l'his type of fact is an "interlocutory" fact. See text accompanying note 46, infra.
'"l'his type of fact is a "collateral" fact. See text accompanying note 46, infra.
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the orthodox analysis the judge would merely decide whether prima
facie the preliminary fact exists. If his decision is affirmative, the jury
would decide whether the preliminary fact really exists. However, it
will be shown that such a result is not always reached by courts
purportedly following the orthodox theory." In fact, the orthodox
theory contains no valid basis for differentiation between questions
of competency to be determined by the judge, and questions of rele-
vancy to be decided by the jury. The alternate theory proposes that
a judge, in determining whether to decide a preliminary fact himself
or leave it to the jury, should be guided by the nature of the prelimi-
nary fact, considering such factors as its degree of technicality, and
the directness or remoteness of its bearing upon the controlling issues
of the case.
Criticism of the Orthodox Analysis
The orthodox solution to the problem of preliminary facts seems
to be simple and easily applicable. Unfortunately, the orthodox
solution is too simplistic and thus difficult to apply in marginal cases.
The difficulty lies in determining which questions truly involve rele-
vancy issues and which involve competency issues-a difficulty
which results from ambiguities in both the concept of relevancy and
that of competency. 5 A priori it would appear that the difference
between the two would be as follows: if the preliminary fact has no
bearing upon the case other than to condition the admissibility of
evidence, the issue would be one of competency; if, on the other hand,
the preliminary fact has a logical bearing upon the ultimate issues of
the case, apart from its significance as conditioning the admissibility
of evidence, the issue would be said to be one of relevancy. The
trouble with the foregoing explanation is that it does not adequately
explain the results in all situations involving preliminary questions
of fact. Suppose, for example, that the results of a blood test are
offered in evidence. Admissibility depends upon whether the test was
properly conducted, a matter of competency. 6 If the blood test was
not properly administered, it is unreliable and thus does not tend to
prove the proposition for which offered, a matter of relevancy. 7 Thus
the preliminary fact would appear to be one of relevancy to be de-
"See text accompanying notes 44, 53, 59, 64, 69, 72.
'IThe writer was first impressed with these ambiguities when he tried to formulate
the difference between the concept of competency and that of relevancy so as to be
better able to explain it to his students.
'"See text accompanying note 37, infra.
'Wee text accompanying note 20, infra.
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cided by the jury. Yet, very likely a judge following the orthodox
analysis would decide the issue himself' on the basis that the ques-
tion is one of competency.
Ambiguities in the Orthodox Analysis: Relevancy v. Irrelevancy
The first ambiguity in the orthodox analysis relates to the concept
of relevancy. What is meant by "relevancy"? Are "relevancy" and
"irrelevancy" true contradictories" and, if not, are we not primarily
concerned with irrelevancy as a basis for exclusion rather than with
relevancy as a basis for admission? In discussing the concept of rele-
vancy, Professor McCormick has stated that evidence may be ex-
cluded as "irrelevant" for either of two quite different reasons: it may
be immaterial or it may lack probative value."0 Every item of evi-
dence is offered to prove some proposition. Two questions then arise:
(1) does the proposition have a bearing on the case under the rules of
"See Pruitt v. State, 216 Tenn. 686, 393 S.W.2d 747 (1965).
"Inconsistent propositions may be either contradictory to each other or they may
he contrary to each other. Contradictories are two propositions so related that both
cannot be true and both cannot be false. One must be true and the other false. There
are no other possibilities. Contraries are two propositions so related that both cannot
be true but it is possible for both to be false. Some other proposition may represent
the trut h. For example, the propositions "John Doe told the truth" and "John Doe told
a lie" are contraries and not contradictories. John Doe's statement may have not been
in accord with reality but it may not have been held out as being true, in which
instance it would be a fiction and neither the truth or a lie. It is difficult to devise true
cntradictories except by opposing a proposition with a denial in haec verba. Possibly
the statements "John Doe is dead" and "John Doe is alive" would be true contradicto-
ries, hut is there a third state of existence for a human being which is neither life or
death?
Fallacious legal reasoning sometimes results from mistakenly regarding a contrary
as though it were a contradictory. This occurs in the case of argumentative pleading.
The rule in pleading is that the defendant puts a proposition asserted by the plaintiff
in issue by contradicting it. For example: Plaintiff alleges "D struck P." Properly,
defendant should put that allegation in issue by the proposition "D did not strike P."
Suppose that, instead, defendant alleges "It was X who struck P." Defendant has
opposed plaintiff's proposition with a contrary proposition, whereas he should have
used a contradictory, and thus defendant has committed the defect of form known as
argumentative pleading. Both propositions "D struck P" and "X struck P" could be
false. It is possible that it was really Y who struck P or possibly P was not struck at
all. The writer believes that the fallacy of regarding the concepts of relevancy and
irrelevancy as contradictories, when they are really contraries, may be partially respon-
sible for the confusion in the orthodox analysis.
"MC(ORMICK at 434-41. Professor McCormick cites with approval Professor
James' excellent article, Relevancy, Probability and the Law, 29 CALIF L. Rv. 689
(1941).
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substantive law;"' and (2) if the answer to (1) is "yes," does the
evidence offered tend to prove the proposition? Conventionally and
arbitrarily we refer to the first issue as one of materiality. 2 The sec-
ond issue is one of probative value or relevancy, as distinguished from
materiality.?
A basic incongruity in the concepts of relevancy and irrelevancy
underlies orthodox thinking on this subject so far as it relates to
preliminary questions of fact. In order to obtain a focal point for
criticism, McCormick? and the Advisory Committee's Notes to the
proposed federal rules of evidence may be regarded as presenting the
orthodox view.?
Professor McCormick links the problem of irrelevancy with the
problem of circumstantial evidence. He states that "[iun our usage
questions of relevancy arise only in respect to circumstantial evi-
dence." He also says that "the most acceptable test of relevancy is
"lhe phrase is usually "under the rules of substantive law and the pleadings."
However, since pleadings are quite informal these days and can be readily amended,
the icus of interest in connection with questions of proof should be on the substantive
law.
-'he use of this term has been criticized. See Rui.Fs OF EvIDENCE FOR UNITED
SWTA'rF'; COURTS AND MAGISTRATES, Advisory Committee Notes at 31 (West pamphlet ed.
19721 (hereinafter cited as Proposed Rules). Just as words, there would seem to be little
dilference between "relevant" (or "irrelevant") and "material" (or "immaterial"). It
seems desirable, however, that there be a term which can be used to test the signifi-
cance. tinder the substantive law, of any proposition sought to be approved. The term
"materiality" is used for that purpose, and it would seem that, if properly understood,
no harm is done. The so-called "Parot Evidence Rule" is really a rule of substantive
law and not a rule of evidence. Before directed verdicts became as common as they
are today, questions of substantive law were more frequently decided by rulings on the
admission of evidence than is now the case.
-It should be noted that either problem can be converted into the other. If an offer
of evidence is rejected because the proposition for which it is offered is immaterial
tinder the substantive law, it is always possible to state that it is being offered to
establish something else, something which unquestionably has a substantive law sig-
nilicance. Then the problem is whether this evidence really proves the new proposition
for which offered. Conversely, the proposition for which an item of evidence is offered
may clearly be material, but the evidence is objected to because it does not tend to
prove the proposition. But any offer of reliable evidence will tend to prove something.
If the objection is met by changing the purpose of the offer, the relevancy objection
will be overcome only to be met by an objection based upon substantive law or lack of
materiality.
2'McCORMICK § 53, at 121-25.
2Of course, these works are predicated upon other writings, the most outstanding
o'which are the works by Morgan, Maguire, Epstein, and James, notes 4 and 20, supra.
26McCORMICK at 436. Similar statements are made in both the third and fourth
editions of McCormick's casebook. C. McCORMICK, CASFS AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW
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the question, does the evidence offered render the desired inference
more probable than it would be without the evidence? '27 This same
concept of relevancy is expressed in proposed Federal Rule 401:28
"'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence."
If "relevancy" and "irrelevancy" are regarded as contradictories,
the assertions that problems of relevancy are related to circumstan-
tial evidence and that relevant evidence is any evidence which ren-
ders a proposition in issue more or less probable cannot be completely
reconciled. Professor McCormick correctly differentiates direct evi-
dence from circumstantial evidence.29 Evidence is direct if its proba-
tive value depends only upon the credibility of a witness who makes
an assertion which is offered as proof of a proposition, or upon the
perception of a trier of fact who observes some item of "real" 0 evi-
dence. If the thing the direct evidence is offered to establish is not
legally significant unless something else may be inferred from it, a
problem of circumstantial evidence is presented. Suppose that fact
B is material, or a "fact of consequence." The direct evidence avail-
able tends to prove fact A. Does the existence of fact A make fact B
more or less likely than it would be otherwise? If it does, a permissible
inference of fact B exists; if not, the evidence tending to prove fact A
is irrelevant.
But suppose that although fact A tends to make fact B more or
less likely than it would be otherwise, the testimony offered to prove
fact A is hearsay three times removed, or an assertion made by a
known incompetent person.' It may be assumed that the offer would
be rejected. It certainly does not meet the standards of relevancy,
because it does not make fact B either more or less likely. On the
other hand, it is not irrelevant since its vice does not result from its
circumstantial nature. It is an inherently unreliable type of evidence.
OF EVII:NcE 290 n.1 (3d ed., 1956); C. MCCORMICK, F. Eu.[,iorr & J. SUTrON. EVIDENCE.
('ASES AND MA'TERIALS 9 n.1 (4th ed. 1971).
-7M'COIMI(CK at 437 (emphasis added).
-Proposed Rules at :30.
"MCCOHMICK at 435.
" Real" evidence is evidence which the judge or jury actually observes, e.g., a
homicide weapon, the scene of an accident, land being condemned, or a contract. The
terms -'demonstrative evidence" and "autoptic proference" are also used.
'his is comparable to the old chestnut about whether the presumption that John
Doe is dead resulting from proof of seven years of unexplained absence is rebutted by
the testimony of the village idiot that he "saw John Doe in Singapore last week."
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Thus, it would seem that there are two reasons why evidence may
lack probative value: (1) because it may be inherently unreliable, i.e.,
lack probative value for any purpose; (2) because, although reliable
enough for some purposes, the evidence offered lacks probative value
for the particular purpose for which it is offered. This second reason
presents a problem of circumstantial evidence and thus a problem of
irrelevancy.
It is clear that relevancy and irrelevancy are not contradictory but
contrary concepts.3 2 An offer cannot be both relevant and irrelevant.
Yet the offer may not fall into either category. It may fail to be
relevant because its unreliable nature does not make the proposition
for which it is offered more or less likely than it would be without this
evidence; and yet it may not be irrelevant because it would not fail
to measure up to the requirements for valid circumstantial evidence.
Since irrelevant evidence is excluded, but relevant evidence is not
necessarily admissible 3 3 it would seem that the more important focus
of attention should be on the problem of irrelevancy rather than upon
that of relevancy.
The significance of the analysis just presented is that it indicates
the inadequacy of the orthodox analysis. If the jury decides prelimi-
nary questions of fact when the relevancy, as distinguished from
irrelevancy, of offered evidence depends upon how the preliminary
question is resolved, the principle is internally inconsistent. Both
McCormick on Evidence3 and proposed Federal Rule 104(a) 35 recog-
nize that problems relating to the hearsay rule, the rule preferring
original writings, and rules relating to the competency of witnesses
should be decided by the judge. However, in all of these instances the
probative value of the challenged evidence is at stake. Thus, these
instances concern preliminary questions of fact involving a problem
of relevancy which, according to the orthodox test, should be decided
by the jury.
An important type of case is sometimes erroneously regarded as
one involving the decision of a preliminary question of fact. An issue
which relates to the basic substantive issues of a case may sometimes
be mistakenly regarded as involving a preliminary question. Al-
though reaching the correct result, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts erroneously discussed preliminary questions of fact in
-.James recognizes this distinction in Relevancy, Probability and the Law, 29
('ALI. L. R v. 689, 691 n.6 (1941).
3See Proposed Rules at 32-33.
"'MCORMICK at 121.
3Proposed Rules at 13.
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Coghlan v. White,31 a case which did not involve that problem. Defen-
dant's liability depended upon whether an appropriate notice had
been served. The court correctly held that the trial judge erred in
excluding a copy of the notice based upon his determination that
proper service had not occurred.
Ambiguities in the Orthodox Analysis: Competency v. Incompetency
Evidence is thought of as incompetent when it is excluded because
of some distinctively evidential rule, as distinguished from a rule of
substantive law. A prototype case is Bartlett v. Smith,37 which in-
volved a suit brought on a bill of exchange. If the bill had been
executed in Dublin, it bore the proper stamps and thus was admissi-
ble in evidence; but if the bill had been executed in London, it was
improperly stamped and thus inadmissible. It will be noted that the
sanction for a failure to place the proper stamps on the bill was not
the invalidity of the bill but its inadmissibility into evidence 2 Thus,
; 236 Mass. 165, 128 N.E. 33 (1920). The plaintiff sued for the death of his intestate
resulting from slipping on ice formed from a spout on defendant's premises. Whether
defendant had a duty to clear away this ice (and hence whether plaintiff had a cause
of action) depended, under the appropriate statutes, upon whether a notice to clear
away the ice had been served upon an occupant of the premises. Plaintiff offered in
evidence a copy of a sufficient notice with the constable's return to the effect that he
had served the notice on one Flaherty, admittedly an occupant. The return was prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein. Defendant objected to receiving the notice
in evidence upon the ground that it had not been served. In support of his objection,
defendant produced the testimony of his agent and Flaherty to the effect that no notice
had been served upon Flaherty. The trial judge regarded the question as a preliminary
question of fact, made the finding that no notice had been served, rejected the offered
evidence, and withdrew the case from the jury. The higher court properly sustained
exceptions. It concluded its opinion by saying:
Whether the notice here in question had been given or not de-
pended in its last analysis on the point whether the return of the
constable or the testimony of Flaherty was true. Whether the prima
facie effect of the return of the constable was overcome by other evi-
dence was a question of fact upon a vital issue between the parties.
Under the circumstances it presented a matter for the jury on which
the judge could not make a final determination.
128 N.E. at 35. From the quoted language it may be inferred that the court realized
that the issue of whether or not the notice was served involved an operative fact in
the case and not a preliminary question of fact. It is unfortunate that most of the
opinion was devoted to a discussion of preliminary questions of fact.
1 152 Eng. Rep. 895 (Ex. 1843).
N'It is difficult to understand the logic supporting this sanction. If the stamping of
commercial paper is a desirable way to raise revenue, the sanction for failure to use
the proper stamps should have a more direct bearing upon the purpose of the act. A
logical although drastic penalty would be to declare the paper void. It might also be
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the plaintiff could still recover if, without introducing the bill into
evidence, he could prove in some other way his cause of action on the
bill." It was ruled that the trial court improperly submitted to the
jury the issue as to whether the bill was properly stamped; that was
a preliminary question of fact which the trial judge should have de-
cided.
Two related observations should be made about Bartlett v. Smith.
First, the issue as to whether the offer should be admitted or excluded
was unrelated to the value of the offer as evidence. There was no
question as to the materiality of the bill of exchange, i.e., that it
related to the substantive issues of the case. Also, there was no ques-
tion as to its probative value. It was both reliable (there was no
contention that it was a forgery) and relevant in the sense that it
tended to prove the proposition for which it was offered, i.e., that the
defendant owed the plaintiff money. It may be said that the bill of
exchange was liable to exclusion for some "policy"4 reason more
important than ascertainment of the true facts of the case. In Bartlett
v. Smith the legal policy involved was the provision of a sanction for
the enforcement of the tax laws. Second, the preliminary fact in-
volved in Bartlett v. Smith had no logical bearing upon any of the
substantive issues of the case. This is not to say that the resolution
of the preliminary question of fact might not be important in deter-
mining the outcome of the case; indeed, it might be controlling. But,
if so, the case would be decided upon some basis unrelated to its
intrinsic merits.
The difference between Coghlan v. White4 and Bartlett v. Smith
is fundamental and provides a starting point for tackling more mar-
ginal and difficult problems. At the one extreme is the situation
presented by Coghlan v. White, in which an operative fact appears
to be a preliminary fact. Of course, decision as to the existence of such
made an offense to pass improperly stamped paper. But to make the bill inadmissible
in evidence does not seem to be an appropriate sanction.
"'Compare Slatterie v. Poole, 151 Eng. Rep. 579 (Ex. 1840), in which it was held
that the content of an improperly stamped piece of commercial paper might be proved
by the admission of a party opponent.
"lhis term is used for want of a better one for the concept involved. There are
many exclusionary rules based upon policy considerations, i.e., social interests consid-
ered more important than the ascertainment of truth in a particular case. The best
examples are the various privileges. For example, a criminal defendant's spouse may
be able truthfully to give very damaging testimony against him. But it is considered
more socially desirable that the testimony be excluded than that spouses be permitted
to testity against each other.
"2:36 Mass. 165, 128 N.E. 33 (1920).
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a fact is for the jury. The judge decides only whether there is suffi-
cient prima facie evidence to warrant submission to the jury. At the
other extreme is the situation in Bartlett v. Smith, where the admis-
sibility of an offer of evidence, challenged upon a ground which has
no connection with the main issues of the case, depends upon deter-
mination of a question of fact which is unrelated to the main issues
to be determined. All reasonable considerations indicate that the
judge should make such a determination.
2
'l'he following examination question was drafted by the writer:
A state statute provides that suit cannot be brought against a munici-
pal corporation for injuries resulting from the defective condition of
its streets unless notice of the defective condition was personally
served on the mayor prior to the accident; and that no purported copy
of any such notice may be admitted into evidence for the purpose of
proving service on the mayor unless the copy bears an
acknowledgement of service signed by the mayor personally. P is suing
the City of D for injuries occurring when his automobile hit a hole in
a street. He offers in evidence a paper addressed to the mayor and
bearing an acknowledgement of service over what purports to be the
mayor's signature. The paper is dated before the accident and states
the fact regarding the hole in the street. D objects to the admission of
the paper on the ground that the paper was never actually served on
the mayor, and that the mayor's name appearing thereon was not
written by him but by someone else. The state of evidence is such that
a reasonable man could reasonably find that the paper was actually
served on the mayor or that it was actually served on someone else
temporarily in the mayor's otice; the state of evidence is also such
that a reasonable person could reasonably find that the purported
signature of the mayor was actually written by him or that it was
written by someone else.
Complete the following statement, filling in blanks and striking
out inapplicable words:
The judge should (decide whether or not the person upon whom
the paper was served was the mayor; if he decides it was not the mayor
he should exclude the paper; if he decides that it was the mayor he
should admit the paper into evidence unless he decides that it is
inadmissible for some other reason) (admit the paper into evidence,
unless inadmissible for some other reason, submitting to the jury,
under proper instructions, the question as to whether the person upon
whom served as actually the mayor) because said question is one of
The judge should (decide whether the signature on the paper was
actually written by the mayor, excluding the paper if he decides it is
not, admitting the paper if he decides it is, unless inadmissible for
some other reason) (admit the paper into evidence, unless inadmissi-
ble for some other reason, submitting to the jury, under proper in-
structions, the question as to whether the signature on the paper was
actually written by the mayor) because said question is one of
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In a case in which the exclusionary rule is based upon a policy
consideration, there are at least two reasons why the preliminary fact
should be decided by the judge. First, the issues should be kept as
simple as possible. If the evidence were provisionally admitted and
the jury told that it should decide the existence of the preliminary
fact before deciding upon the weight to be given to the offered evi-
dence, the jury might become confused by having to decide questions
unrelated to the main issues of the case. Second, for the jury to decide
the preliminary questions might defeat the very policy considerations
underlying the exclusionary rule. The latter objection is most obvious
in the case of a privilege: if the jury were to decide the preliminary
question of fact upon which the existence of a privilege depends, it
would have to hear the privileged testimony. 3
If the concept of competency were limited to the Barlett v. Smith
situation and the concept of relevancy limited to that of materiality,
little problem would exist. But how should one handle the situation
in which the probative value of an offer of evidence depends upon a
preliminary fact? According to the orthodox analysis, this involves a
problem of relevancy and, thus, the jury has the ultimate decision.
Yet there are situations in which probative value is unquestionably
involved, because the reliability of evidence is at stake, which never-
The purpose of this question is to compare two exclusionary rules which look quite
similar but upon analysis are quite different. Of course, the requirement that notice
he served upon the mayor personally is substantive in nature. It is one of the essential
conditions necessary for the plaintiff's recovery. Thus, it should be decided by the jury
as other main issues are. The judge only decides if there is sufficient prima facie
evidence to warrant a jury decision. Thus, in the first part of the exercise the first
alternative should be struck out and the second allowed to stand and the words "mate-
riality: application of a rule of substantive law" would appear on the first line.
By contrast, the requirement that the mayor's signature acknowledging service be
written by him personally is strictly evidentiary in nature. The admissibility of the
paper. as a method of proving service, depends thereon, but not the cause of action. If
service was on the mayor personally, but he had his secretary attach his name to the
acknowledgment of service, the plaintiff would not be denied his cause of action if he
could prove the service in some other way. Thus, in the second part of the exercise the
first alternative should be allowed to stand and the second struck out. On the second
line should appear: "competency: admissibility dependent upon a technical rule of
evidence."
"For example: A criminal defendant's alleged wife knows, and is willing to testify
to. some facts very damaging to him. Defendant objects on the ground that the witness
is his wife. There is a question as to whether the parties were in fact married. If the
judge admits the testimony and leaves to the jury the question of whether to consider
it. even if the jury decides that the marriage did exist, and therefore should not
consider the adverse testimony, it will have heard that testimony. It is questionable
whether the members of the jury could erase the adverse testimony from their minds.
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theless may be regarded as situations involving problems of compe-
tency. Consider two examples: (1) the party offering a hearsay decla-
ration contends that it is a declaration against interest; admissibility
depends upon whether or not extraneous facts made the statement
self-serving;44 (2) the result of a blood analysis is offered in evidence;
objection is made upon the ground that the test was not properly
conducted by a competent technician.45 In both cases, authorities
supporting the orthodox analysis recognize that the preliminary ques-
tion of fact (i.e., whether the statement was really self-serving in the
first case, and whether the technician was competent in the second)
will be decided by the judge. Both cases involve the application of
technical evidence rules which are regarded as matters of compe-
tency. Yet both involve relevancy in the sense that the probative
value of the evidence depends upon the factual determination. There-
fore, if relevancy vis-a-vis competency is the test, the orthodox analy-
sis offers no clue to a solution of those situations where the notions
of competency and relevancy coincide.
Two Types of Preliminary Facts
Preliminary facts thus far have been discussed mainly as if a
single phenomenon were involved. Actually, there are two types of
preliminary facts, which may be called interlocutory facts and
collateral facts.46 A preliminary question of fact is called "interlocu-
tory" if its resolution has no bearing on the case other than to provide
the basis for determining whether a challenged offer of evidence
should be admitted. Preliminary facts in cases such as Bartlett v.
Smith, in which the exclusionary rule is based upon some policy
consideration, are interlocutory facts. For example, a witness offers
to testify to having seen the defendant commit a criminal offense.
The defendant objects upon the ground that the witness is his wife.
The admissibility of the testimony depends upon whether the defen-
dant and the witness are in fact married. But the fact of their mar-
riage has no bearing upon whether the defendant committed the
"See, e.g., Demasi v. Whitney Trust & Sav. Bank, 176 So. 703 (La. 1939), in which
the declarant's statement that she had authorized certain deductions was offered as a
declaration against interest. It was shown, however, that the declarant could not with-
draw the balance of the account unless said statement was signed. Thus, the statement
was self-serving and inadmissible. The judge made the decision.
";Compare Pruitt v. State, 216 Tenn. 686, 393 S.W.2d 747 (1965).
'This terminology has been coined by the writer. He does not believe that hereto-
fore this distinction has been made.
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offense charged.17
On the other hand, preliminary facts may have a logical bearing,
however remote, upon the legally operative facts, wholly apart from
the consequence that the admissibility of some item of evidence de-
pends thereon. Consider again the issue of the skill of a technician
making a blood test. If the skill is lacking, the specimen should not
be admitted. But if the specimen is admitted, the question of the
technician's skill is still present. It is a preliminary fact of this type
to which the term "collateral" fact is hereinafter applied. Another
example is the issue of the opportunity of a witness to observe the
matter concerning which he offers to testify. Professor McCormick
raises the question of whether the judge or the jury should make the
determination of opportunity to observe and states that the decisions
are not uniform." This problem is resolved by proposed Federal Rule
602 as follows:
A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is intro-
duced sufficient to support a finding that he has personal
knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowl-
edge may, but need not, consist of the testimony of the witness
himself. This rule is subject to the provisions of Rule 703,
relating to opinion testimony by expert witnesses. (emphasis
added).
Rule 602 requires only a prima facie showing of personal knowledge
to render the testimony admissible by the judge. If the testimony is
admitted, however, the question must be resolved eventually by the
jury.
Although Rule 602 refers to Rule 703 as a limitation, Rule 702,
stating the basic requirements for expert testimony, is more interest-
ing than Rule 703 from the present point of view. 9 It is inferable from
';Of course, whether the offered testimony is admitted may have a vital bearing
upon the outcome of the case, but for reasons other than those upon which the accept-
ance of the testimony depends.
"C. MCCORMICK. CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAw OF EVIDENCE 21 n.13 (3d ed
195{0).
"Rule 703, which serves as a limitation on Rule 602, provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert
bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made
known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied
upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or infer-
ences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in
evidence.
Proposed Rules at 94. Rule 702, stating the basic requirements for expert testimony
provides:
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Rule 702 that the judge decides whether a person offered as an expert
meets the requirements therefor. However, the qualification of an
expert constitutes a collateral fact rather than an interlocutory fact,
since such probative value as may flow from an expert witness' testi-
mony depends upon his qualification to be an expert witness.
It might appear that the orthodox distinction between questions
of competency and questions of relevancy is tantamount to the dis-
tinction here made between interlocutory preliminary facts and col-
lateral preliminary facts. Probably the orthodox analysis is predi-
cated upon that assumption. Certainly, when preliminary facts are
interlocutory facts, decision should be made by the judge .5' As re-
gards collateral facts, McCormick states: "When the conditioning
fact determines merely the relevancy of the offered fact there is no
need for any special safeguarding procedures, for relevancy is a mere
matter of probative pertinence which the jury understands and is
willing to observe ....
If the basis for distinction is as just stated, it proves too much. In
all cases in which an exclusionary rule is based upon probative value,
conditioning facts will be collateral. Yet some rules relating to the
probative value of evidence are based upon its reliability and are
highly technical in nature, e.g., the technical proficiency of a witness
offered as an expert or of a technician who made a test. Even the
orthodox analysis regards these latter as competency rules and em-
powers the judge to decide preliminary facts, without distinguishing
as to which type of preliminary fact is involved. Thus, another line
of distinction must be found.
Exclusionary Rules Based on Probative Value
The distinction between interlocutory and collateral preliminary
questions of fact is significantly related to the reasons for exclusion
of evidence. Of course, with respect to exclusion of evidence on the
ground of immateriality, there is no problem of preliminary questions
of fact at all, because what may appear to be preliminary facts are
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion
or otherwise.
Id. at 95.
"The only possible exception to this treatment involves the problem of coincidence
of issues, discussed in text accompanying notes 99-105, infra.
'"McCoRMICK at 125.
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really operative facts of the case to be decided by the jury. On the
other hand, where evidence is excluded for policy reasons, prelimi-
nary questions of fact will nearly always be interlocutory"2 and thus
for the judge to decide, since the basis for the policy supporting the
exclusion will almost never have a bearing upon the issues actually
being litigated. It is only where the reason for exclusion is based upon
weakness in probative value53 that the problem arises as to whether
the judge or the jury should make the decision. Where weakness in
probative value is the reason for exclusion, the preliminary facts are
collateral to the main issues of the case. The case authority as to who
decides these collateral facts is far from conclusive.
An excellent example of the confusion of authority is forcefully
presented in the confession cases prior to 1935. Prior to the develop-
ment starting with Brown v. Mississippi54 and culminating with
Rogers v. Richmond,55 which bases the rule excluding coerced confes-
sions upon public policy (due process of law), involuntary confessions
were excluded upon the ground that they were unreliable. At that
time decisions were badly divided as to whether the judge should
decide the question of voluntariness and admit or exclude the confes-
sion based upon his decision, or whether he should admit the confes-
sion if supported by prima facie evidence, leaving the jury to deter-
mine whether the confession was voluntary and therefore whether to
consider it.5 1 The confusion in the cases at the time when exclusion
2Although facts conditioning policy exclusions are usually interlocutory, such
need not always be the case. It is possible for a policy exclusion to be conditioned upon
a collateral fact. See text accompanying note 78, infra. Of course, the most standard
type of policy exclusions are the privileges. In cases involving privileges, the prelimi-
nary facts are interlocutory facts. For example, if the issue is the privilege against the
adverse testimony of a spouse, the issue as to whether the marriage took place is held
to be for the judge. Goodson v. State, 162 Ga. 178, 132 S.E. 899 (1926); In re Pusey's
Estate, 180 Cal. 368, 181 P. 648 (1919); State v. Hancock, 28 Nev. 300, 82 P. 95 (1905).
"It should be noted that exclusion on the basis of weakness in probative value may
arise either from (1) unreliability i.e., weakness in probative value for any purpose or
(2) irrelevancy, i.e., lack of probative value for the purpose for which offered. The
solution offered in this article to the problem of who decides preliminary questions of
fact does not depend on the distinction between these two categories of weakness in
probative value.
'297 U.S. 278 (1936).
-365 U.S. 534 (1961); see also Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
'3 WINrIoE ON EVIDENCE § 822 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1970). Today it is regarded as
a violation of due process of law for the judge to submit the issue of voluntariness to
the jury; he must decide the question himself. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
This result follows sensibly from the development basing the exclusion of involuntary
questions on policy grounds.
"See MCCORMICK at 349 et seq. Cases presenting both points of view are collected
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was based upon reliability demonstrates the inadequacy of the ortho-
dox approach.
For the purposes of deciding preliminary questions of fact all ex-
clusionary rules based upon probative value present the same type
of problem. Common to both problems of unreliability and problems
of irrelevancy is the consideration that the preliminary fact in either
case cannot logically be isolated from the main issues of the case. To
differentiate by designating those rules designed to eliminate unrelia-
ble evidence as rules of "competency" is undesirable because that
term is also applied to exclusionary rules based upon policy. The two
types of competency involve different problems.
Rival Considerations
There are strong arguments both for submitting factually condi-
tioned questions of probative value to the jury, provided a prima facie
showing has been made, and for allowing the judge to decide such
questions. In favor of submitting these preliminary questions to the
jury is the obvious argument that they logically relate to the control-
ling issues the jury is to decide. In a trial by jury, the jury decides
facts. Can it be said that the operative issues of a case are being
submitted to the jury if it is not permitted to decide every question
which relates to those main issues? It may well be argued that if the
judge excludes from the jury any evidence which prima facie has a
bearing upon the case, the party offering that evidence pro tanto has
been deprived of his right to a jury trial.
In favor of permitting the judge to decide preliminary questions
of fact is the procedural interest in relieving the jury from deciding
too many collateral issues. Since the jury must consider the entire
case at one time, it is desirable to keep its attention focused as much
as possible on a limited number of controlling issues. The judge is in
a position to decide summarily questions that arise during the trial;
from a mechanical point of view, the jury has no such advantage.
Additionally, the jury could well become confused by too many
collateral questions requiring very complicated instructions.
The question as to who should decide the preliminary question of
fact becomes acute principally in cases in which the offer of evidence
is rejected by the judge. In those cases in which the judge admits the
in Annot., 170 A.L.R. 567 (1947) and Annot., 85 A.L.R. 870 (1933). There is also a third
point of view which is known as the "Massachusetts Rule." According to that view,
the judge decides the admissibility of the confession in the first instance. If he lets it
go in, the issue of voluntariness is resubmitted to the jury. Cf. text accompanying notes
102-104, infra.
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evidence, the jury still passes upon its weight and so will have an
opportunity to consider the evidence supporting and opposing the
preliminary fact., ' The only difference in the jury's function in situa-
tions in which the judge decides the question as one of fact and those
in which the jury makes the decision is in the form of the instruction.
If the question is for the jury, the jury may be instructed that if it
decides against the conditioning fact it should disregard the controv-
erted evidence. Such an instruction would be improper if this ques-
tion is for the judge and he admits the evidence; however, the jury
would still be instructed that it is to evaluate the evidence.
Suggested Solution
In cases where an exclusionary rule based upon probative value
is conditioned upon the determination of a preliminary question of
fact, a result need not be reached in which the judge himself decides
all such questions or, to the contrary, one in which all such questions
are submitted to the jury if a finding could be supported by prima
facie evidence. It is suggested that resolution of the issue be based
upon the relative facility with which the jury can decide preliminary
questions. If the significance of a preliminary collateral question of
fact may be made readily obvious to a reasonable layman, the judge
should only require prima facie evidence that the conditioning fact
does exist and submit the question to the jury for final decision. If,
on the other hand, the significance of the preliminary collateral ques-
tion of fact would require considerable explanation to the jury, in the
interest of expediting the trial the judge himself should decide that
question. Thus, the jury should decide, for example, whether a wit-
ness had an opportunity to observe the thing concerning which he
offers to testify. On the other hand, the judge should decide the
qualifications of the technician who made a blood test, or whether a
statement offered as a declaration against interest was truly against
the interest of the declarant. One aspect of the determination as to
who will decide the preliminary question is whether the issue is one
of fact in the most limited sense, i.e., credibility or inference, or
whether it involves the application of legal standards. In the former
5'United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950); Nass v. Nass, 149 Tex. 41,
228 S.W.2d 130 (1950). Fowel v. Wood, 62 A.2d 636 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1948). Bell
v. State, 164 Ga. 292, 138 S.E. 238 (1927). In the last two cases cited it was held that
the judge should decide whether a child was a competent witness. The court ruled,
however, that the jury could also consider the child's capacity in evaluating his testi-
mony. See also Conway v. State, 177 Miss. 461, 171 So. 16 (1936); State v. Dotson, 96
W. Va. 596, 123 S.E. 463 (1924).
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situation, the issue would seem to be more suitable for jury decision.
Since the determination of legal standards is traditionally and dis-
tinctively within the province of the judge, the latter situation would
be more likely to call for the judge's decision.
It is quite likely that in many instances the analysis suggested
herein will reach the same result as the orthodox analysis. This simi-
lar result, although perhaps frequent, is nevertheless accidental since
the theories upon which the results are reached are quite different.
However, when the ambiguities in the concepts of relevancy and
competency are considered, it is believed that the analysis suggested
herein more realistically indicates the judicial process involved in
making a determination.
It is no objection to the suggested analysis that many borderline
questions will be found in which considerable discretion will have to
be left with the trial judge. The law is replete with standards rather
than rules capable of rigorous application to all situations. Neither
the traditional analysis nor that suggested will clearly explain all of
the cases. The traditional analysis may seem more clear-cut as a
literary matter, but there is little rational basis for making the dis-
tinction between questions of competency and those of relevancy un-
less it is upon the basis herein suggested.
Comparisons
How does the proposed theory compare with the orthodox theory
so far as actual results are concerned? As previously explained, there
is no difference in result between the two theories as regards material-
ity and policy exclusions." It is only when an offer of evidence chal-
lenged on the ground of lack of probative value depends upon a pre-
liminary collateral fact that a different analysis, although not neces-
sarily a different result, is involved.
A review of three problems discussed earlier will illustrate this
difference in analysis."' Under the proposed theory and proposed Fed-
eral Rule 602,61 the decision as to a witness' opportunity to observe
"'Cf. text accompanying notes 41, 42, 52, and 53, supra.
"These problems are (1) the opportunity of a witness to observe the matter to
which he offers to testify (text accompanying note 45, supra); (2) the qualifications of
an expert witness (text accompanying note 45, supra); (3) the voluntariness of confes-
sions at a time when involuntary confessions were excluded because of unreliability
(text accompanying notes 51-55, supra).
"See quotation in text accompanying notes 48 and 49, supra. This rule is not
changed by the proposals made in a bill introduced in Congress to reconsider the
proposed rules. See H.R. 5463, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
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would be resolved by the jury. The logic of a rule forbidding a witness
to testify to matters outside his knowledge should be obvious to any
reasonable juror. Yet so far as the orthodox rule is concerned, Profes-
sor McCormick states that the decisions are in conflict. 2 Such a
result is natural under the orthodox analysis. A witness' knowledge
has a bearing upon his credibility and thus upon the probative value
of his testimony; the problem, however, is one of reliability and not
one of circumstantial evidence. If a witness who offers to testify to
fact X lacked opportunity for adequate observation, his testimony
does not increase the probability that fact X occurred. Thus it is not
relevant. But if fact X is itself the operative fact, it is not sought to
prove fact X in order to prove something else. Thus no problem of
circumstantial evidence is involved although there is a problem of
probative value in the sense of reliability. Whether the opportunity
to observe would involve a problem of relevancy or one of competency
points up the ambiguity in those two terms.
There is complete concurrence between the proposed theory and
the orthodox theory that the judge should pass upon the qualifica-
tions of a witness offered as an expert. Of course, if the judge admits
the testimony of the witness, the jury may again consider his qualifi-
cations in evaluating his testimony. That is probably why expert
witnesses are normally questioned regarding their qualifications in
the presence of the jury. The procedure for qualifying an expert wit-
ness is usually quite perfunctory, and qualifications are frequently
acknowledged or waived. If a real contest over the technical capacity
of an expert witness should develop, however, the proper procedure
would be for the judge first to hear the testimony outside the presence
of the jury. If ruled to be unqualified, the witness would not testify;
if ruled competent, evidence as to the witness' qualifications would
again be repeated in the presence of the jury. That the judge should
pass upon the witness' qualifications as a matter of fact and not
merely as a matter of prima facie evidence is supported by proposed
Federal Rule 702 ".6 Current decisions also seem to support that re-
sult." If the orthodox analysis is applied, however, would the expert's
62
C. MCCORMICK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 21 n.13 (3d ed.
1956).
"See note 49, supra.
"Pruitt v. State, 216 Tenn. 686, 393 S.W.2d 747 (1965); Wisniewski v. Weinstock,
130 N.J.L. 58, 31 A.2d 401 (1943); Meiselman v. Crown Heights Hosp., 285 N.Y. 389,
34 N.E.2d 367 (1941); United Rys. and Elec. Co. v. Corbin, 109 Md. 442, 72 A. 606
(1909). In Meiselman v. Crown Heights Hosp., the trial judge ruled that a doctor,
offered as an expert, was incompetent because he received his training abroad. The
ruling was reversed. The reviewing court held that the doctor was competent and
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qualifications be a matter of competency or relevancy? It would
clearly seem to be the former. Yet, the issue as to qualifications is
clearly collateral to the main issues of the case in that the probative
value of the expert's opinion depends upon his qualification to give
an opinion. But since probative value is involved, the issue might well
be regarded as one of relevancy under the orthodox analysis.
The confusion in the pre-1935 confession cases" demonstrates the
ineptness of the traditional differentiation between questions of com-
petency and questions of relevancy. The decisions were well divided
as to which type of issue was involved in the question of voluntari-
ness. Under the suggested analysis there would have been no problem
of classification. The issue would clearly have been one of probative
value based upon a question of reliability.
This writer is of the opinion that the line of decisions which held
the issue to be for the judge was correct for two reasons. First, the
question of voluntariness involves the determination and application
of legal standards as well as matters of fact in the strictest sense, i.e.,
matters of credibility and inference. Second, if the jury makes the
determination, it is necessary for it to be aware of the challenged
confession irrespective of its final decision as to whether the confes-
sion was voluntary.
Another comparison between the two bases for analysis may be
found in connection with the determination of whether or not a docu-
ment is authentic. There are various methods by which a document
may be used and different types of preliminary questions involved."
should be allowed to testify. It was held, however, that it was proper for the jury also
to consider the doctor's qualifications in deciding what weight to give to his testimony.
1See text accompanying notes 54-57, supra. Between 1936 (date of decision of
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278) and 1961 (date of decision of Rogers v. Richmond,
365 U.S. 534), both the reliability and the privilege rationales were used to decide cases
dealing with whether an offered confession was voluntarily obtained. Even after Rogers
v. Richmond, the idea that an involuntary confession should be excluded on grounds
of unreliability is not entirely obsolete. If the judge determines that a confession was
voluntary and thus admissible, the jury should still be allowed to consider the evidence
as to how the confession was obtained in passing upon its weight, and such a considera-
tion necessarily entails a consideration of the reliability of the confession.
6All documentary evidence falls into one of two categories. Either the document
is a form of real evidence, i.e., the existence of the document is an operative fact or
circumstantial evidence of a fact in issue, or it is a form of admissible hearsay. If the
document is being offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein, it is being
used testimonially and, to be admitted, must be qualified under the hearsay excep-
tions. If the document is a form of real evidence, its very existence may be an operative
fact, as is usually true of a will, contract or deed. If the authenticity of a document
offered as real evidence is in issue, a question of materiality would be involved and
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Whatever the use of a document may be, however, it will lack proba-
tive value unless it is authentic, i.e., unless it actually is what it
purports to be. Thus, under either line of analysis, the decision should
be for the jury. Under the traditional analysis it should be for the jury
because authenticity would clearly seem to involve a question of rele-
vancy. Under the theory herein advanced, the jury should decide
because that body can readily understand the importance of authen-
ticity.
Circumstantial Evidence
Under the traditional analysis preliminary facts relating to rele-
vancy should be left to the jury. However, even if the concept of
relevancy be limited to cases involving circumstantial evidence, i.e.,
to problems of irrelevancy, preliminary questions of fact are not al-
therefore the problem of preliminary facts would not arise. See text accompanying note
53, supra. Compare Patton v. Bank of LaFayette, 124 Ga. 965, 53 S.E. 664 (1906).
Although a document might not itself be an operative fact, it might be circumstan-
tial evidence of an operative fact. Since the circumstantial value of the document
would depend upon its authenticity, there would be a relevancy question in the strict-
est sense of the word and, under the orthodox analysis, the jury should make the final
decision as to authenticity. This result was reached in Winslow v. Bailey, 16 Me. 319
(1939), where the authenticity of a paper which defendant claimed plaintiff had used
to execute fraudulently the note sued upon was in issue. A similar result was reached
in Dunklee v. Prior, 80 N.H. 270, 116 A. 138 (1922), where the authenticity of an
impeaching statement was in issue. No hearsay problem was involved because an
impeaching statement is not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the
statement. The mere fact of the existence of the impeaching statement is circumstan-
tial evidence which has a bearing upon the reliability of the witness' testimony. Under
the suggested theory the decision in these two cases would also be for the jury. The
significance of authenticity is a matter readily understood by the jury and one which
the jury is as capable of deciding as the judge. The question is one of fact in the most
fundamental sense of the term, i.e., one in which the credibility of witnesses is in-
volved, as distinguished from a fact involving an element of evaluation.
If the document is to be used testimonially, i.e., to prove the truth of the matter
asserted, a hearsay problem arises. Under the orthodox analysis, preliminary questions
concerning hearsay problems are usually for the judge. Furthermore, if the document
is offered upon the theory that it includes an admission, such as in Coleman v. McIn-
tosh, 184 Ky. 370, 211 S.W. 872 (1919), an even greater conceptual difficulty is pre-
sented because, under the analysis suggested herein, a question of procedural policy
is involved and preliminary questions are for the judge. See text accompanying notes
77-78, infra. Regardless of how the hearsay problems are analyzed, however, they do
not arise until the question of authenticity has been resolved. The significance and
difficulty of the authenticity question would seem to be no different in cases in which
the document is used testimonially than in cases in which it is presented as a form of
real evidence. Thus, whatever other problems are decided by the judge, the problem
of authenticity should be for the jury.
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ways decided by the jury. Consider the problem of comparables in
eminent domain cases. If the market value of a piece of land being
condemned is in issue, evidence of the sales price of other similar land
in the same neighborhood may be admissible. Of course, it is impor-
tant that the other land sold be truly comparable to that now being
evaluated. The comparability of the other land would seem clearly
to present a problem of circumstantial evidence and thus one of irre-
levancy. The sale price of the other land is of no significance except
as it has a bearing upon the value of the land being condemned.
Under the traditional analysis the decision should be made by the
jury. At the same time, the legal significance of the question of
comparability is such as to make it a question for the judge under the
suggested analysis. There is case authority to sustain this latter ap-
proach.1
Sometimes it becomes necessary to establish a similarity of condi-
tions. This necessity may exist in cases in which testimony of the
prior condition of an instrumentality is offered as having a bearing
upon its condition at the time of an accident. Under both the tradi-
tional " and suggested analyses, such preliminary questions would
seem to be for the jury. Indeed, under the orthodox analysis all ques-
tions in which the use of circumstantial evidence depends upon a
preliminary fact are questions for the jury. However, in Bell v. State,
it was held to be for the judge to determine similarity of conditions
in a case involving evidence of a pre-trial experiment. There again the
problem involved circumstantial evidence but related to scientific
data more understandable by the judge than the jury. Under the
orthodox analysis the issue would necessarily have been for the jury.
Evidence of a prior offense may be used against a criminal defen-
dant if it is relevant upon some basis other than proof of the bad
character of the defendant. It is essential, however, that the prior
offense was actually committed. The question as to whether or not it
was committed is a preliminary question of fact. Should the judge be
"State v. Elder, 70 Wash.2d 414, 423 P.2d 533 (1967); People v. Graziadio, 42 Cal.
Rptr. 29 (1965); Manda v. City of Orange, 82 N.J.L. 686, 82 A. 869 (1912); Kendal v.
Flanders, 72 N.H. 11, 54 A. 285 (1903).
"Broderick v. Coppinger, 40 Ariz. 524, 14 P.2d 714 (1932). Compare Finch v. W.R.
Roach Co., 295 Mich. 589, 295 N.W. 324 (1940), in which a plaintiff offered to introduce
in evidence a model of a ladder which collapsed while he was working, causing his
injuries. The purpose of the model was to aid a witness in connection with his testi-
mony. Of course, the similarity of the ladder to that involved in the accident had to
be determined before it could be used. It was held that the question of similarity was
basically for the jury.
''164 Ga. 292, 138 S.E. 238 (1927).
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convinced that the offense was committed before allowing evidence
thereof, or is it sufficient that there be only prima facie evidence to
establish the other offense, the jury being left to determine whether
it was committed before considering it as circumstantial evidence?
Since this is a problem of circumstantial evidence, the orthodox rule
would require only a prima facie finding by the judge. There is indeed
support for that point of view. 70 However, it would seem that under
the analysis herein suggested, the other result should be reached.
Upon consideration of the drastic effect of confronting a defendant
being tried for one offense with having committed another, it would
seem that the fact of the other offense should be established to the
judge's satisfaction before the evidence is admitted. Also, the jury
should not be confused by having to consider two cases at the same
time'.
7
Whether an injured party actually heard a statement intended to
give notice of the existence of a defective condition seems clearly to
be a preliminary question of fact for the jury. The significance of the
issue as to whether the statement was heard would be apparent to
most jurors. The same result would be reached under the orthodox
analysis because the issue involves a matter of circumstantial evi-
dence and thus a question of irrelevancy.
72
Competency of Witnesses
Under all views it is conceded that the competency of witnesses
to testify is a preliminary question of fact for the judge.73 This view
is also carried forward under proposed Federal Rule 104(a).71 Since
,*Lankford v. State, 93 Tex. Crim. 442, 248 S.W. 389 (1923); Commonwealth v.
Robinson, 146 Mass. 571, 16 N.E. 452 (1888).
7 Cf. Maguire and Epstein, Preliminary Questions of Fact in Determining the
Admissibility of Evidence, 40 HARv. L. REV. 392, 404 n. 41 (1926).
2However, the United States Supreme Court in Gila Valley, Globe & H. Ry. v.
Hall, 232 U.S. 94 (1914), held that such a preliminary question should be decided by
the judge. The Court uncritically based its holding upon the old theory that all ques-
tions of admissibility of evidence are for the determination of the judge. Professor
Maguire has justifiably criticized that decision. J. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE: COMMON SENSE
AND COMMON LAW, 223-25 (1947).
"Bell v. State, 164 Ga. 292, 138 S.E.238 (1927); Western Nat'l. Life Ins. Co. v.
Williamson-Halsell-Frazier Co., 37 Okla. 213, 131 P. 691 (1913); Parrish v. State, 139
Ala. 16, 36 So. 1012 (1904); Commonwealth v. Reagan, 175 Mass. 335, 56 N.E. 577
(1900).
""Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness,
the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the
judge, . . ." Proposed Rules at 13 (emphasis added). This rule has been unchanged
by proposed H.R. 5463, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
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problems relating to the competency, as distinguished from the credi-
bility, of witnesses are of a technical nature, it would follow that
under the proposed theory the decision should be made by the judge.
Furthermore, if the jury were to make the decision as to competency,
the distinction between competency and credibility would be elimi-
nated. The two systems of analysis reach the same result in this
situation, but it should be noted in passing that rules relating to the
competency of witnesses really depend upon what is considered the
witness' reliability. Since the reliability of testimony has a bearing
upon whether it renders the propositions for which offered more or
less probable, the question would seem to be one of relevancy under
the orthodox analysis and thus for the jury. Nevertheless, the correct
result is reached under the orthodox theory by the tour de force of
classifying the questions under the heading of competency. The right
result is reached by cases following the orthodox theory but not for
the right reason. The correct reason is reached under the theory sug-
gested herein: the technical nature of such questions and the need for
summary decisions require decision by the judge.
Dying Declarations
The issue as to who should determine whether a dying declarant
realized his extreme situation when making an accusatory statement
is subject to the same diversity of answers as the issue as to who
should pass upon the voluntariness of confessions.15 It is natural that
this confusion should exist under the traditional analysis. The rule
admitting dying declarations is an exception to the hearsay rule,
which in turn is based upon the principle that evidence should be
reliable. Thus, according to the orthodox view, the reliability of an
offer, having a bearing upon its probative value, would involve an
7sHolding that the judge should make the decision are State v. Rich, 231 N.C. 696,
58 S.E.2d 717 (1950); People v. Hubbs, 401 Ill. 613, 83 N.E.2d 289 (1949); Comer v.
State, 212 Ark. 66, 204 S.W.2d 875 (1947); People v. Corder, 306 Ill. 264, 137 N.E. 845
(1922); and State v. Monich, 74 N.J.L. 522, 64 A. 1016 (1906). However, even if the
dying declaration is admitted by the judge, the jury will still consider the same evi-
dence in determining what weight to give to it. For cases which hold that the judge
merely passes upon whether there is prima facie evidence leaving to the jury the final
question, see State v. Proctor, 269 S.W.2d 624 (Mo. 1954); State v. Garver, 190 Ore.
291, 225 P.2d 771 (1950); People v. Denton, 312 Mich. 32, 19 N.W.2d 476 (1945); Berry
v. State, 143 Tex. Crim. 67, 157 S.W.2d 650 (1942); State v. Dotson, 96 W. Va. 596,
123 S.E. 463 (1924); Commonwealth v. Regan, 175 Mass. 335, 56 N.E. 577 (1900);
Lipscomb v. State, 75 Miss. 559, 23 So. 210 (1898). In Commonwealth v. Reagan, it
was felt that the trial judge has a discretion as to whether to decide the issue himself
or to leave it to the jury for decision. 56 N.E. at 579.
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issue of relevancy and would seem to be a question for the jury.
However, the authorities classify hearsay problems in general as in-
volving issues of competency for the judge to decide." Evidence of a
dying declaration has a highly emotional impact upon the jury and
is difficult to refute. Even if the jury decides that the legal prerequis-
ites of the dying declaration have not been met, the effect of the
declaration may remain in the minds of its members. When the po-
tential dangers of having a jury consider a dying declaration are
considered, the proposed theory would seem to require that prelimi-
nary questions of fact conditioning the admissibility of such an offer
be decided by the judge.
Procedural Questions
Most evidential rules are designed to help in the process of ascer-
taining truth and promoting justice. There are some rules, however,
which are designed merely to provide for orderly and expeditious
trials. Matters must be disposed of even at some sacrifice of truth and
justice. Evidence rulings concerning procedural problems involve
matters of procedural policy and thus may be regarded as falling
within the third type of reason for exclusion previously examined.
77
Thus classified, preliminary facts conditioning such rulings should be
decided by the judge. Preliminary facts which relate to exclusionary
rules based upon policy are usually interlocutory facts, i.e., they have
no logical connections with the main issues of the case. However, in
some cases they may be collateral facts. For example, the issue as to
the sufficiency of a showing of probable cause to justify the issuance
of a search warrant has a bearing upon the ultimate issue of the case.
Thus it is a collateral fact. Yet, because it involves a policy against
invasion of privacy, it may properly be regarded as a question for the
judge and not the jury.
78
There are various examples of preliminary facts conditioning ex-
clusionary rules based upon procedural considerations which are de-
cided by the judge. The judge decides whether a proper foundation
has been laid for impeachment, 79 whether a prospective witness is
unavailable so as to qualify a hearsay exception, and if consent is
required before a blood test may be administered, whether the con-
"6See text accompanying notes 7-8, supra.
7See text accompanying note 52, supra.
"Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 505 (1925).
"Schmidt v. Stone, 50 N.D. 91, 194 N.W. 917 (1923).
wNew York Central R.R. v. Pinnell, 112 Ind. App. 116, 40 N.E.2d 988 (1942).
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sent was obtained.81 Four particular types of procedural problems, the
"Dead Man's Statutes," vicarious admissions, questions of opinion,
and the "Best Evidence Rule," warrant a more extended considera-
tion.
Most states have statutes relating to cases prosecuted or defended
by the personal representative of a deceased party which forbid a
living party to the litigation or any other interested witness from
testifying to a transaction (or, in some states, occurrence) involving
the deceased. These statutes are colloquially called "Dead Man's
Statutes." The issue of preliminary facts arises in these cases where
the survivor has sought to divest himself of any interest by assigning
any cause of action he might have had. May he then testify in favor
of his assignee, who will be a party to the case? Whether he is compe-
tent to testify is sometimes said to depend upon whether the assign-
ment was made in good faith. Under both the traditional analysis and
the new analysis suggested, the question of good faith should be de-
cided by the judge82
Historically, no party or other person interested in the outcome
of a case could testify. The rule forbidding a survivor from testifying
is regarded as the remnant of the more general historical exclusionary
rule based upon the idea that a person's interest in a case would cast
doubt upon the reliability of his testimony. If that were the basis for
the modified rule, the traditional analysis should require that the
final decision be left to the jury. The preliminary fact of good faith
would be collateral to the main issue because it would relate to the
interest of the witness and thus his reliability. Under the alternate
analysis, the decision would be for the judge because the matter is a
technical one and not readily related to the main issue. It would
seem, however, that the narrowing of the exclusionary rule implies a
changed basis for it. Now it seems that the testimony of the survivor
is excluded out of a notion of fair play. It is said that since death has
sealed the lips of one party to the transaction, the law should seal the
lips of the other. Thus a matter of procedural policy is involved, and
the preliminary question of whether the assignment of the cause of
action was made in good faith should be decided by the judge.
All admissions, including vicarious admissions,"' have generally
"But see Poston v. Clinton, 66 Wash.2d 911, 406 P.2d 623 (1965), in which the
opposite result was reached.
9
2Moosbrugger v. Swick, 86 N.J.L. 419, 92 A. 269 (1914); Semple v. Callery, 184
Pa. 95, 39 A. 6 (1898); Hill v. Helton, 80 Ala. 528, 1 So. 340 (1887).
"A vicarious admission is unlike other admissions in that it is not made by a party
to the litigation. Under appropriate circumstances, a statement made by an agent of
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been regarded as exceptions to the hearsay rule. Application of the
hearsay rule is an outstanding example of evidence being excluded
because of its unreliability. It has been said that hearsay exceptions
should be qualified by a showing of necessity and some basis for
reliability, the latter to take the place of the oath and cross examina-
tion. Upon that basis it is difficult to support the admissibility of any
admission, much less a vicarious admission.84
The drafters of the proposed federal rules of evidence have devel-
oped a more rational way of handling the admissions problem., Rule
801(d) does not attempt to rationalize any type of hearsay exceptions
so far as admissions are concerned; rather, the concept of hearsay is
redefined so as to exclude all types of admissions. Thus, the rule
allowing the introduction of admissions becomes a procedural rule,
6
and not a rule based upon some showing of reliability. Just as a party
may testify against himself," extra-judicial statements made by him
may be used against him. He may then attempt to refute his prior
admission or lessen its force by explanation. The same analysis ap-
plies when the extra-judicial declaration is made by a party's agent,
servant, or co-conspirator.
a party, predecessor in title, or co-conspirator of a party, may be used against the party
as if he had made the statement himself.
"'Compare Morgan, Admissions as an Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 30 YALE L.J.
355 (1921).
"'Rule 801(d) provides in part:
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if-
(2) Admissions By Party-Opponent. The statement is offered against
a party and is (A) his own statement, in either his individual or a
representative capacity, or (B) a statement of which he has mani-
fested his adoption of belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person
authorized by him to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D)
a statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter within the
scope of his agency or employment, made during the existence of the
relationship, or (E) a statement by a co-conspirator or a party during
the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
(emphasis added).
"That the drafters of the proposed federal rules believed that they were basing the
admissibility of all admissions upon procedural grounds rather than upon some theory
of reliability is shown by their comment to Rule 801(d)(2). See Federal Rules at 108,
wherein the drafters state: "Admissions by a party-opponent are excluded from the
category of hearsay on the theory that their admissibility in evidence is the result of
the adversary system rather than satisfaction of the conditions of the hearsay
rule. .. ."
"Of course, a party will rarely testify against himself voluntarily, but he may well
do so unwittingly on cross-examination.
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Under standard authority extra-judicial statements by an agent
are admissible against his principal if the agent had authority to
make statements binding upon his principal.m The preliminary ques-
tion of fact involved is whether the alleged agent had the authority
to make the statement. Under the theory suggested the question is
procedural in nature and the preliminary fact should be decided by
the judge. Under the traditional view it would seem that the same
result should be reached. The statement made by an agent involves
a hearsay problem usually regarded as a matter of competency.
Whether the alleged agent was actually authorized to make the state-
ment would seem to have no bearing upon the realiability of the
statement. Thus, the preliminary fact would be interlocutory, not
collateral, and should be determined by the judge. Considerable au-
thority, however, reaches the other conclusion. 9 A modern trend
would admit extra-judicial statements made by an agent or servant
while the employment relationship is still in existence and related to
any matter occurring within the course of his employment. 0 If this
new trend should ever become established, the same analysis should
apply to the preliminary question of whether the employment rela-
tion exists: decision should be by the judge.
The issue as to the admission of the extra-judicial statement of a
co-conspirator may arise in two contexts. First, there may be the
situation in which the prosecution is for a conspiracy, with or without
a concurrent charge of an overt act. If, in such a situation, the extra-
judicial statement of a co-conspirator is offered to prove the fact of
the conspiracy, a coincidence of issues problem is presented; that is
to say, the very issue upon which the competency of the testimony
depends is the same as an ultimate issue of the case. The resolution
of preliminary questions in this context is dealt with below,9' where
it is submitted that the issue should be left to the jury. The other
situation concerns cases where only the charge of an overt act is in
issue, and the extra-judicial statement of an alleged co-conspirator
is offered not to prove the conspiracy but to prove the overt act itself.
In such a situation, existence of the conspiracy is a preliminary fact
necessary for acceptance of the declaration of the co-conspirator.
"This is comparable to the test indicated in Rule 801(d)(2)(c), note 85, supra.
"J.C. Lysle Willing Co. v. S.W. Holt and Co., 122 Va. 565, 95 S.E. 414 (1918);
Smith v. O'Bryant, 181 S.W. 123 (Mo. 1916); Eagle Iron Co. v. Baugh, 147 Ala. 613,
41 So. 663 (1906); Birmingham Mineral R.R. v. Tennessee Coal, Iron and R.R., 127
Ala. 137, 28 So. 679 (1900).
"See Rule 801(d)(2)(D), note 85, supra.
"See text accompanying notes 102-104, infra.
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Under both the traditional analysis and that suggested, the existence
of the conspiracy is a preliminary fact for the judge to decide. 92
Under the common law rule, the vicarious admission of a prede-
cessor in title may be offered against a party presently claiming under
the predecessor.!" Thus, John Doe either as plaintiff or defendant may
claim to own a piece of real or personal property or a chose in action,
and may claim that he acquired the property on a specified date by
conveyance from Richard Roe. If, at a time when, under John Doe's
theory, Richard Roe owned the property, Roe made a statement to
the effect that he did not own the property, the statement may be
used in evidence against Doe. The issue as to when Roe's statement
was made constitutes a preliminary question of fact.94 This type of
preliminary question of fact provides a clear example of a procedural
question, and thus the time of the statement should be decided by
the judge. '-
The issue of the credibility of evidence, when challenged under
the rule which forbids a witness to testify as to his opinion, is rarely
conditioned upon the determination of a preliminary question of fact.
"Runels v. Lowell Sun Co., 318 Mass. 466, 62 N.E.2d 121 (1945).
"Rule 801(d)(2) seems not to embrace the situation of a vicarious admission by a
predecessor in title. If the predecessor in title is not available, his statement might be
used as a declaration against interest under Rule 804(b)(4). See Proposed Rules at 131.
If available, he might be called as a witness, and if he repudiates his denial of owner-
ship at the appropriate time, his prior statement could be admitted under Rule
801(d)(1), which provides:
(d) A statement is not hearsay if-
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at
the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination con-
cerning the statement, and the statement is (A) inconsistent
with his testimony, ...
The proposed federal rules of evidence are, as previously mentioned, in an indeter-
minate status at the present time. See note 12, supra. The House bill, H.R. 5463, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), seeks to weaken the force of the above quotation by adding
the following proviso:
... Provided that a prior inconsistent statement under clause (a)
shall not be admissible as proof of the facts stated unless it was given
under oath and subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial or hearing
or in a deposition or before a grand jury.
"If Roe is unavailable to testify at the trial and his statement denying ownership
was made in a disserving context (the denial might be self-serving as, for example,
where Roe thereby seeks to avoid a tax liability), this statement may be used as a
declaration against interest. In that event the judge would make the necessary prelimi-
nary determination. See text accompanying note 80, supra. If the statement does not
qualify as a declaration against interest, it must be used, if at all, as a vicarious
admission by a predecessor in title.
"De Grappenrud v. Thomas, 14 Ala. 681 (1848).
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Thus, it is generally beyond the scope of this article. However, there
is at least one instance in which the determination of such a prelimi-
nary question may be involved. It is well established that an expert
may testify in response to a hypothetical question. Of course, whether
the hypothetical question may be used depends upon the preliminary
question of fact whether the hypothesis is in accord with the evidence
in the case. Should the judge or jury make that determination? The
probative value to be attached to the expert's opinion depends upon
how closely the hypothesis upon which he based his opinion reflects
actual facts of the case. Thus the preliminary question is a collateral
one. According to the orthodox view the issue would become one of
relevancy, and thus the decision should be by the jury. There are
decisions which support that point of view. 6
In order to apply the theory suggested herein to the problem of
hypothetical questions, it is necessary to determine the rationale for
the rule excluding opinion evidence. It seems that the exclusion is
based upon procedural policy. A tribunal is composed of several
parts: judge, jury, counsel, witnesses. There seems to be a separation
of powers. Normally, the function of a witness is to relate his percep-
tions, but interpretation of those perceptions is a function of the jury.
There are situations in which the only way a witness can relate his
perceptions is by giving what could be interpreted as a conclusion.
One of the values of expert testimony is that it allows a technically
proficient witness to aid the jury by interpreting his perceptions, i.e.,
giving his opinion, as to matters the jury might otherwise find diffi-
cult to decide.
Upon consideration of the rationale for the opinion rule, it is sub-
mitted that the decision as to the similarity of the hypothetical ques-
tion to the evidence should be made by the judge for two reasons.
First, the decision as to similarity is technical in nature and thus one
which the judge is in a better position to make. Of course, it must be
remembered that even if the judge allows the expert to express an
opinion, the jury will still consider the similarity between the hypoth-
esis and its view of what the evidence shows the facts of the case to
be. Second, the competency of all opinion evidence, including expert
opinion, involves a separation of function between witness and jury
which is a matter of procedural policy which, like all policy-oriented
preliminary questions of fact, should be decided by the judge. It may
be objected that the conditioning fact is collateral rather than interlo-
cutory. It has been recognized, 7 however, that although facts condi-
9sWeissman v. Dept. of Labor and Indus., 52 Wash. 2d 477, 326 P.2d 745 (1958).
"7See text accompanying note 78, infra.
PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS
tioning exclusionary rules based upon policy are usually interlocu-
tory, they may be collateral."
The so-called "Best Evidence Rule"-that a copy of, or oral testi-
mony regarding, the contents of a document is not admissible unless
it is established that there is an original document and that it cannot
be produced for legitimate reasons-is predicated both upon reliabil-
ity and upon procedural policy. Under either theory the judge should
determine the preliminary facts. Even if the weakness in probative
value, i.e., the unreliability of the secondary evidence, be regarded
as the basis for exclusion, this matter is so technical in nature that a
summary determination by the judge is preferable. These conclusions
seem to be supported by the case authority even under the traditional
approach."
Coincidence of Issues
Suppose that a type of preliminary question of fact which would
normally be decided by the judge coincides with one of the operative
facts of the case. There may appear to be a dilemma as to wheher
the decision should be made by the judge or jury. Fortunately this
situation does not frequently arise. For example, the dilemma posed
in the famous case of State v. Lee 0 would not occur now because
spouses are no longer disqualified from testifying in each other's be-
half."1'
As previously mentioned, a coincidence of issues problem may
exist in conspiracy cases.0 2 Consider a case in which the prosecution
is for conspiracy either joined or not joined with charges of the overt
act."" The logic of the situation would seem to require the same
This is especially true when matters of procedural policy are involved. Consider,
for example, the rule against leading questions. This is basically a procedural rule to
obtain the orderly presentation of evidence. However, it may be considered that an-
swers in response to a leading question are not reliable. Compare Patton v. Bank of
LaFayette, 124 Ga. 965, 53 S.E. 664 (1906).
"Fauci v. Mulready, 337 Mass. 532, 150 N.E.2d 286 (1958); St. Croix Co. v.
Seacoast Canning Co., 114 Me. 521, 96 A. 1059 (1916); People v. Dolan, 186 N.Y. 4, 78
N.E. 569 (1906).
"0127 La. 1077, 54 So. 356 (1911).
"'The case involved a murder prosecution. Admittedly Lee was the murderer. The
sole question was whether the defendant was Lee. He claimed not to be. Mrs. Lee was
called to testify that the defendant was not her husband. Objection was made that a
wife cannot testify for her husband. The judge was permitted to pass upon that ques-
tion although it was the ultimate issue involved in the case. Id. at 357.
'"See text accompanying note 91, supra.
"'Compare this situation with that in which a defendant is charged only with the
overt act but an attempt is made to use the extra-judicial declarations of an alleged
1974]
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treatment as that followed by the traditional "Massachusetts Rule"
in regard to the voluntariness of confessions. 04 Under that approach
the judge would decide first whether, in his opinion, the conspiracy
existed. If the decision is negative, the prosecution would be required
to prove the conspiracy without the aid of the extra-judicial state-
ments of the alleged co-conspirator. If affirmative, the statements
could be used, but the jury would still be allowed to pass on the
existence of the conspiracy.
The coincidence of issues problem may take a turn in which the
offer of evidence is self-defeating. Consider the case of a bigamy
charge wherein the alleged first wife is presented to testify to the fact
of the alleged first marriage."" The very theory upon which the prose-
cution offers her testimony would make her an incompetent witness
since, if she is his wife, she cannot testify against her husband over
his objection. It may be argued that by objecting to her testimony,
defendant concedes that she is his wife. But although the rule exclud-
ing her testimony is generally said to be a rule of privilege, it is in
reality a rule of competency. 06 The inconsistency in the prosecution's
offer precedes that in the defendant's objection, and thus the judge
should exclude the testimony.
Conclusion
The differences in results between the two theories as to whether
the judge or jury should determine preliminary questions of fact are
not great. An attempt is made herein to provide a conceptual clarifi-
cation of the process which actually occurs in making the decision.
In two instances, that in which an operative fact appears to be a
preliminary fact and that in which the preliminary fact has no rela-
co-conspirator against him. See text accompanying note 92, supra.
'"'See McCoRMICK at 349 et seq.; Annot., 170 A.L.R. 567, 587-88 (1947); Annot.,
85 A.L.R. 870, 888-89 (1933).
"'"Barber v. People, 203 Ill. 543, 68 N.E. 93 (1903). This must not be confused with
cases in which the alleged second wife is offered as a witness, e.g., Matz v. United
States, 81 App. D.C. 326, 158 F.2d 190 (1946); Murphy v. State, 122 Ga. 149, 50 S.E.
48 (1905); Lowery v. People, 172 Ill. 466, 50 N.E. 165 (1898); Cole v. Cole, 153 Ill. 585,
38 N.E. 703 (1894). In cases such as these no problem exists. If the first marriage cannot
be established, there is no bigamy irrespective of the validity of the second marriage.
If the first marriage is established, the second marriage is invalid and there is no bar
to testimony by the purported second wife.
"'See Brown v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 512, 158 S.E.2d 663 (1968), in which it
was held to be error even to put the wife on the stand in the absence of express consent
by the defendant husband.
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tion to the case except to condition the introduction of evidence, the
same result is reached under both theories. In the former situation
the jury decides the preliminary question of fact provided that the
judge finds prima facie evidence, and in the latter situation the judge
decides.
It is in those situations in which the preliminary fact relates to the
probative value of evidence that there is a difference of reasoning and,
to some extent, a difference in result between the two theories. In
fact, the orthodox analysis offers no conceptual scheme based upon
meaningful referents; a judge's decision as to whether to decide the
preliminary question of fact himself must be based upon his unguided
personal evaluation. Although the alternate theory suggested in-
volves variable concepts with considerable room for judgment in their
application, it does form a meaningful frame of reference for the
making of specific decisions.
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